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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-MILLER V. MAXWELL S
INTERNATIONAL, INC: INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISORY
EMPLOYEES UNDER TITLE VII AND THE ADEA .
INTRODUCTION
Victirris of employment discrimination usually have an ade
quate means for bringing sui~ against their employer under Title
VII of.the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"),1 the Age Discrim
ination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"),2 and other federaP
and state4 statutes. In situations where the employer is undercapi
talized or bankrupt,S however, the victim niay not obtain adequate
compensation from his or her employer. 6 As an alternative, these
victims have sought compensation from the supervisor responsible
for the discrimination.7
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (originally enacted as
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 &Supp. V 1993) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No.
90-202, 81 Stat. 602).
3. The Americans with Disabilities Act, for example, is analogous to TItle VII
and the ADEA in many respects, including its purposes, 42 U.S.c. § 12101(b) (Supp. V
1993), its remedies, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. V 1993), and, specifically, its definition
of the term "employer." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(5) (Supp. V 1993).
4. For a state-by-state review of sexual harassment law, see 2 ALBE CONTE, SEX.
UAL HARASSMENT IN TIfE WORKPLACE: LAW AND PRACflCE, §§ 10.1-.52 (1994).
5. See Phillip L. Lamberson, Comment, Personal Liability for Violations of Title
VII: Thirty Years of Indecision, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 419 (1994). Lamberson presents a
hypothetical scenario in which Mary, an employee at Company X, suffered overt dis
crimination by her supervisor based on her sex. Mary received a $350,000 verdict in her
favor against Company X. Unfortunately for Mary, however, Company X filed for
bankruptcy soon thereafter, resulting in few remaining assets available to pay Mary's
claim. Id. at 419-20.
6. Plaintiffs have also brought suit against individual supervisors in situations
where the employer is inlmune from liability because the supervisor's conduct is so
outrageous as to be beyond the scope of their employment and the employer has taken
affirmative steps to remedy the situation. Cf. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986), and infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text. Absent individualliabil
ity, there exists a "liability gap" because employers are not held liable in all situations.
William L. Kandel, Age Discrimination: Recent Decisions by Appellate Courts Under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Through Mid-1993, at pt. XIII (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 475, 1993).
7. There are other circumstances in which supervisors may be named as individ
ual defendants, such as to destroy diversity and keep the case in state court. Courts
generally have allowed this unless the individual defendants are only nominal. See
Bradley v. Consolidated Edison Co., 657 F. Supp. 197,207 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Charles S.

143

144

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:143

_Courts that have found supervisors personally liable under Ti
tle VII and the other employment discrimination laws have fol
lowed the congressional mandate to broadly construe these statutes
to afford the victims adequate compensation. 8 Based on a plain
reading of the statutes' definitions of "employer," these courts have
held that supervisors, as "agents" of -the employer, qualify as em
ployers under the damages, provisions. 9
However, the'Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently
found that supervisors cannot be held liable under Title VII or the
ADEA.lO In Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc.,n the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in a split decision determined that
supervisors are not "employers" as defined under either Act, and
thus could not be held subject to the statutory damage provisions.
The court further noted that the purpose of the "agent" provision in
the definition of employer is to incorporate respondeat superior lia
bility into the statute. 12
This Note argues that courts should hold supervisors liable for
their discriminatory acts under Title VII and the ADEA based on a
number of factors.13 First, the plain, language of the statutes states
Mishkind & Louise B. Wright, Joinder of Individual Defendants in Employment Litiga·
tion: Is Removal Still Possible?, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 117 (1993).
Some plaintiffs may also be motivated by revenge against the discriminating super
visor. See Lamberson, supra note 5, at 420. There may also be situations where it is
necessary to "pierce the corporate veil" and hold individual officers and directors per
sonally liable for discriminatory practices. See, e.g., Smith v. Capitol City Club of
Montgomery, 850 F. Supp. 976, 981 (M.D. Ala, 1994).
8. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 765 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concur
ring); Owens v. Rush, 636 F.2d 283, 287 (10th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).
The United States Supreme Court has stated that courts must "avoid interpreta
tions of Title VII that deprive victims of discrimination of a remedy, without clear con
gressional mandate." County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981).
9. See infra notes 87-116. It should be noted that Congress has limited the liabil
ity of federal employees for common law tort violations. Federal Employees Liability
Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564
(1988), enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1988). The House Report stated that the bill
"would remove the potential personal liability of Federal employees for common law
torts committed within the scope of their employment, and would instead provide that
the exclusive remedy for such torts is through an action against the United States under
the Federal Tort Claims Act." H.R. REp. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988), re
printed in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5947.
10. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub
nom. Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 587.
13. For an overview of individual liability of supervisors, see generally William L.
Kandel, Financial- Exposure of Managers for Personnel Decisions, 19 EMPLOYEE REL.
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that supervisors should be subject to the damages provisions of the
statutes. Second, the legislative history offers as much support for
supervisor liability as against it. Finally, the ADEA offers even a
stronger argument for individual supervisor liability than does Title
VII.
Part I of this Note provides the background to Title VII'and
the ADEA Part I also examines the case law related to the issue of
individual liability under these Acts. Part II discusses the recent
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision, Miller v. Maxwell's
International, Inc.14 Part III analyzes the Miller decision in light of
the legislative background and pertinent case law. Finally, this
Note concludes that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
erred in holding that individual supervisors cannot be held liable
under either Title VII or the ADEA.
I.

BACKGROUND

At one time, discrimination iQ. employment was a way of life
for many people: African-Americans and ethnic minorities were
shut out of all but the most menial of occupations;15 women re
ceived considerably lower pay than men16 and suffered harassment
without restraint at the hanqs of th~ir male supervisors;17 and the
L.J. 267 (1993) (briefly examining individual liability under TItle VII and tort law); Bar
bara B. Brown & Nancy L. Abell, Investigating and Remedying Claims of Sexual Har
assment, at 77, pt. V (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 426,
1992) (reviewing individual liability under discrimination statutes and tort law); Doug
las L. Williams, Individual Liability and Defending Individual Co-Defendants (Defend
ant's Perspective), 463 ALI-ABA CoURSE OF STUDY: ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT L. &
LITIG. 205 (1989) (analyzing defenses for supervisors named as individual defendants in
TItle VII suits); John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Liability of Supervisors, 210
N.Y. L.J. 3,27 (1993).
For a general look at individual liability of personnel managers under various em
ployment laws, including the National Labor Relations Act, the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, and TItle VII, see Gary W. Florkowski, Personal Liability Under Federal Labor
and Employment Laws: Implications for Human Resource Managers, 14 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 593 (1989).
14. 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Miller V. La Rosa, 114 S.
Ct. 1049 (1994).
15. Between 1890 and 1930, roughly two million African-Americans were em
ployed in agricultural work, compared to less than 100,000 employed in professional or
semi-professional fields. ARTIiUR M. Ross & HERBERT HILL, EMPLOYMENT, RACE,
AND POVERTY 4 (1967).
16. It is estimated that in 1960, full time female workers earned only 61 % of the
income of men in the same category; this figure decreased to 57% by 1974. JOAN AB.
RAMSON, OLD Boys-NEW WOMEN: THE POLmcs OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 80 (1979).
17. A 1980 study found 42% of all female federal employees surveyed had exper

146

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:143

aged and disabled were considered a burden rather than capable
and qualified members of the working world. Virtually none of
these employment practices were regulated by either federal or
state government. In fact, the existing Civil Rights Amendments
and the Reconstruction era acts 18 were so narrowly interpreted by
courts that they offered little protection to anyone. 19
The New Deal legislation of ,th~ 1930s was the first major ad
vance into the regulation9f employment practices. 20 An even more
comprehensive attack on employment discrimination came in the
1960s; however, with the implementation of TItle VII of the Civil
ienced some form of sexual harassment. CONTE, supra note 4, at § 1.1. A follow-up
study in 1986 did not show any change in this rate. Id. A survey among female employ
ees within the private sector proved even more startling, with 90% of the women re
sponding having Claimed some form of sexual harassment at work. Id.
Even with the passage of Title VII, courts did not recognize a cause of action for
sexual harassment until the mid 1970s. Id. at § 2.1.
Unwilling to deem the "personal proclivit[ies)" of supervisors employment
, discrimination, the courts [initially] rendered decisions ... that lacked consis
tency and sometimes conviction as judges waded through novel issues without
the benefit of legislative history or statutory guidance, and advanced a number
of reasons why sexual harassment was not sex discrimination under Title VII.
Id. (quoting Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975),
vacated on procedural grounds, 542 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977».
18. The Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.c. § 1981 (Supp. V 1993), allows "all'
persons" the rights:
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punish
ment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and no
other.
Id.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), creates liability against any
person acting "under color of any [state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us
age" who deprives another person of rights protected by the Constitution or federal
laws. Id.
19. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Hodges v. United States, 203
U.S. 1 (1906). These acts were resurrected in the late 1960s and the 1970s. See McDon
ald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Johnson v.Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (19.75); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
20. See 1 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 1.01, at 1-3 (1994). '
The New Deallegislatiori included the Unemployment Relief Act of 1933, ch. 17,48
Stat. 22, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race in employing people under
the Act; the National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74~i98, 49 Stat. 449 (1935),
which created the National Labor Relations Board to deal with labor and union dis
putes; and various executive orders aimed at eliminating discrimination by government
contractors. This legislation did not impose specific requirements on employers, but
rather "operated primarily to support and protect the right of workers to bargain collec
tively with their employer." LARSON, supra, § 1.01, at 1-2.
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Rights Act of 196421 and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967.22 Since the passage of these Acts, Congress has con
tinued to broaden their scope through various amendments, includ
ing the recent implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.23
A.

Title VII24
In the wake of the Birmingham uprisings of May, 1963, Presi

dent Kennedy proposed a civil rights bill. 25 The resulting Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was created primarily to offer minorities protec
tion against racial discriminatiori.26 The Act included titles address
ing voting rights,27 public accommodations,28 and school
desegregation. 29 Title VII, however, was undoubtedly the center
piece of the Act. 30
Congress relied on its powers under the Commerce Clause of
21. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993».
22. Pub. L. No. 90-202,81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1988 & Supp. V 1993».
23, Pub. L. No.·102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in various sections
of 2 U.S.c., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e (Supp. V 1993».
24. For an analysis of the legislative history of TItle VII, see Francis J. Vaas, TItle
VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 431 (1966); CHARLES WHALEN
& BARBARA WHALEN, THE LoNGEST DEBATE (1985).
25. In his radio and television address of June 11, 1963, President John F. Ken
nedy made the following statement:
We face ... a moral crisis as a country and as a people. It cannot be met by
repressive police action. It cannot be left to increased demonstrations in the
streets. It cannot be quieted by token moves or talk. It is time to act in the
Congress, in your State and local legislative body and, above all, in all of our
daily lives. . .. I shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a
commitment it has not fully made in this century to the proposition that race
has no place in American life or law.
John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights,
PuB. PAPERS, 468, 469 (June 11, 1963).
26. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., H.R. Doc. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1963).
The broad purposes of TItle VII were to remove barriers favoring the class of white
employers over minority employees, and to compensate employees for injury resulting
from unlawful employment discriInination. There was also a need to give a statutory
basis for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, an agency created to handle
.
employment discrimination claims. Id.
'. 27.. Pub. L. No. '88-352, TItle 1,78 Stat 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971 (1988».
28. Pub. L. No. 88-352, TItle II, 78 Stat. 243, 243-46 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988».
29. Pub. L. N,o. 88-352, TItle IV, 78 Stat. 246, 246-49 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (1988».
30. See 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, ET Ab., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINAtiON 1
(1988).
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the Constitution31 in order to apply Title VII "to the fullest jurisdic- .
. tional breadth constitutionally permissible."32 Because of the re
strictive interpretations of the civil rights amendments and the early
civil rights acts,33 Congress needed to create new legislation in or
der to protect the rights of people who historically have been vic
tims of discrimination in employment.
However, Congress did not include "sex" as a protected cate
gory in the original bill.34 Many members of Congress believed that
the nature of sex discrimination required its own legislation. 35
These congressmen feared that including sex in the Civil Rights Act
would make the Act too controversial, threatening the entire
cause.36 Nevertheless, at the time the amendment was intro
duced,37 the bill already had enough support to withstand the incor
poration of gender protections. 38 Over time, the protections
against sexual discrimination have indeed strengthened the Act.39
As enacted, Title VII requires that a person alleging a claim
file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC").40 After an EEOC determination of the merits of the
claim, either the EEOC or the claimant may bring a civil action in
31. u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
32. LEE M. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, § 2:02 at 2-3
(1993). In 1972, Congress applied its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to ex
tend coverage to state and local employees. Id.
33. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
34. Representative Howard Smith of Virginia submitted an amendment to the bill
to include sex as a protected class. 110 CONGo REC. 2577-84 (1964), reprinted in 1 LEG
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3213
28. As an opponent of the civil rights bill, Representative Smith intended to sabotage
the bill by making it too radical to be passed into law. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note
24, at 116; see also Leo Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law Ill: Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963,20 HASTINGS L.J. 305,
310-13 (1968) (describing the "peculiar" history of Title VII's sex provisions).
35. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 24, at 116. Representative Emanual Celler,
the bill's sponsor, opposed the inclusion of the amendment when first proposed. He
claimed it would strike down many state laws that already protected women from dan
gerous employment conditions. Id.
36. Id.
37. See supra note 34.
38. Representative George Meader claimed: "Smith outsmarted himself. At this
point there was no way you could sink the bill." WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 24, at
117.
.
39. Representative Katherine St. George in support of the amendment predicted
that "[t)he addition of that little, terrifying word 's-e-x' will not hurt this legislation in
any way. In fact, it will improve it. It will make it comprehensive. It will make it
logical. It will make it right." 110 CoNG. REC. 2581 (1964), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 3221.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
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court against the respondent(s).41
Originally, courts could hold employers charged in the com
plaint liable under Title VII for backpay, reinstatement, or "any
other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate,"42 if they
were found to have committed an "unlawful employment prac
tice."43 Such practices today include discrimination based on race,
sex, religion or national origin in matters of compensation or terms
of employment.44 Furthermore, an employer cannot segregate em
ployees45 or make any employment decision where race, sex, reli
gion or ethnicity is a motivating factor.46
B.

TheADEA

Because of its distinctive nature,47 Congress did not include
age as a protected characteristic under Title VII.48 Congress did
recognize the need to protect those over forty against discrimina
tion, however, and requested that the Secretary of Labor create a
41. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1988). The person alleging the claim must receive
a right-to-sue letter pursuant to § 2000e(5)(f)(1) before pursuing remedies in federal
court.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988 & Supp. V 1993». With the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, plaintiffs can also recover compensatory and punitive damages for
intentional acts of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993), discussed in
fra at notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
43. "Unlawful employment practices" are defined at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1988) makes it unlawful for an employer "to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
46. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993). Other unlawful employment prac
tices affecting employers include: discrimination in training or apprenticeship programs,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1988); discrimination that causes disparate impact, 42 U.S.c.
§ 2000e-2(k) (Supp. V 1993); and discriminatory testing procedures, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e
2(1) (Supp. V 1993).
47. See Peter H. Harris, Note, Age Discrimination, Wages, and Economics: What
Judicial Standard?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y. 715, 732 (1990).
48. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, YOUR TIME WILL COME: THE LAW OF AGE DIS
CRIMINATION AND MANDATORY RETIREMENT 14 (Russell Sage Foundation, Social Re
search Perspectives Rep. No. 10, 1984).
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report. 49 This report eventually led to the enactment of the
ADEA50 in 1967.51
Like Title VII, the ADEA was enacted in order to eliminate
employment discrimination and to prohibit unfair employment
practices. 52 The Act itself is a "hybrid"53 of Title VII and the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").54 The objectives of the ADEA, to
eliminate employment discrimination and prohibit unfair employ
ment practices, parallel the objectives of Title VII.55 The remedies
and procedures, however, are modeled on the FLSA.56
The ADEA prohibits unfair employment practices by employ
ers,57 employment agencies,58 and labor organizations. 59 A person
49. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965).
50. For an overview of the ADEA as originally enacted, see. Note, The Age Dis
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380 (1976); see also Marilyn
Mohrman-Gillis, Note, Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978: A
Questionable Expansion, 27 CATH. U. L. REv. 767 (1978) (considering the 1978 amend
ments to the ADEA).
For a discussion of how the Civil Rights Act of 1991 impacts the ADEA, see How
ard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act
of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093 (1993).
51. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1988 & Supp. V 1993».
52. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988). The purpose of the ADEA was "to promote em
ployment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of
meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 1d.
53. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 578 (1978). Justice Marshall, in the majority
opinion, stated that Congress' intention in enacting the ADEA was, "on the one hand,
... to use an existing statutory scheme and a bureaucracy with which employers and
employees would be familiar and, on the other hand, [to reflect Congress'] dissatisfac
tion with some elements of each of the preexisting schemes," i.e. the NLRA, the FLSA,
and TItle VII. [d.
54. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The FLSA was passed in 1938 as
an effort to improve the working conditions under which a large number of the nation's
workforce were employed. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1988). The Act created and administered a
minimum wage, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988); set limits on number of working hours, 29
U.S.C. § 207 (1988); established child labor restrictions, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1988);' and
provided for liquidated damages against employers, 29 U.S.c. § 216 (1988).
55. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Lorillard, 434 U.S. at
584; see also H.R. REP. No. 40(11), l02d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 696-97.
56. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 579 (1978): See COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC
WELFARE, S. Doc. No. 723, 90th Cong., Illt Sess., reprinted in 113 CONGo REC. 31,250
(1967) (enforcement procedures based on FLSA replaced the procedures in the original
bill that were based on the NLRA).
57. 29 U.S.c. § 623(a) (1988). Section 623(a) makes it unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi
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can bring a civil action under section 626(b)60 to recover backpay,
unpaid overtime compensation, and liquidated damages (for willful
violations).61
C.

"Employers" Under Title VII and the ADEA

"Employer" is defined under Title VII62 to include any "per
son"63 who has fifteen or more employees64 for a required period of
time, "and any agent65 of such a person."66 Congress amended the
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would de
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
chapter.

Id.
58. 29 U.S.c. § 623(b) (1988). "Employment agency" is defined as "any person
regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an em
ployer and includes an agent of such a person." 29 U.S.c. § 630(c) (1988).
59. 29 U.S.c. § 623(c) (1988). "Labor organization" is defined as "a labor organi
zation engaged in an'industry affecting commerce, and any agent of such an organiza
tion." 29 U.S.c. § 630(d) (1988).
60. 29 U.S.c. § 626(b) (1988). As in Title VII, a person must receive a right-to
sue letter from the EEOC pursuant to 29 U.S.c. § 626(d) (1988) before seeking federal
court remedies.
.
61. Moreover, §.626(b) states: "The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced
in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in §§ 211(b), 216, , ..
and 217 [of the FLSA]." § 626(b).
62. Congress most likely borrowed the "employer" definition from the NLRA. '
See infra note 86. Contra Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633, 634 (1st Cir; 1983)
(finding that "employer" was borrowed from the Unemployment Compensation Act,
26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1988», cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984).
63. "Person" is defined as "one or more individuals, governments, governmental
agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations,
legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated
organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under title 11, or receivers." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(a) (1988).
64. "Employee" is defined as "an individual employed by an employer," except
for persons elected or appointed to a state public office. The term does include u.s.
citizens employed in a foreign country. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(f) (Supp. V 1993).
65. Congress did not define "agent" in .Title VII. However, the Equal Employ
ment Opportunity Commission defines an agent as "a person or entity which acts or has
the power to act on behalf of another." EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA), § 605.8(c) at 605
22. For discussion of the agent clause as used in Title VII, see 1 LARSON, supra note 20,
at § 5.03[2]; BARBARA L. SCHLEI AND PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA·
TION LAW 1002 (2d ed. 1983),388 (Five Year Supp. 1989), 136 (1987-89 Supp. 1991).
66. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b) (1988). The statute states in full:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting com
merce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
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definition in 197267 in order to lower the requirement for number of
employees from twenty-five68 to the present fifteen. 69 This amend
ment achieved more effective application of Title VII to small busi
nesses. 70 "Because of the existing limitation in the bill proscribing
coverage of Title VII to [twenty-five] or more employees or mem
bers, a large segment of the nation's work force is excluded from an
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and
any agent of such a person, but such term does not include (1) the United
States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States,
an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia sub
ject by statute to procedures of the competitive service (as defined in section
2102 of title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor
organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of title 26,
except that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer
than twenty-five employees (and their· agents) shall not be considered
employers.

Id.
67. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 was created to allow more
individuals to recover under TItle VII. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.c. §§ 5108 & 5314 and various sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e). "Facts,
statistical evidence and experience demonstrate that employers, labor organizations,
employment agencies and joint labor-managem~nt committees continue to engage in
conduct which contravenes the provisions of TItle VII. The existence of such practices
demonstrates the immediate need to effectuate the purposes of the Civil Rights Act of
1964." H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137, 2144 (1972).
.
68. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 253 (codi
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988».
69. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86
Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b) (1988». The House of Representatives actu
ally recommended reduction of the requirement to eight employees. See H.R. 1746,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971)., The Senate amended the House bill requirement to 15
employees as a compromise with senators concerned with the effect on small busi
nesses. S. 2515 § 2, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); see also the remarks of Sen. Paul Fan
nin, 118 CONGo REC. 2409-10 (1972), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 1297-1301; the remarks of Sen.
Norris Cotton concerning the detrimental effect on small business, 118CONG. REC.
2391 (1972), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT Op
PORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 969, 1009-11; the remarks of Sen. James Allen, 118 CONGo
REC. 2389-90 (1972), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOY
MENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 1269-72.
70. The Senate, in reviewing the recommendation for reducing the number of
employees requirement, stated that such a reduction was necessary because "discrimi
nation should be attacked wherever it exists ... [and] small establishments have fre
quently been the most flagrant violators of equal employment opportunity." S. REP.
No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 410, 417 (1972).
Senator Jacob Javits pointed out that small businesses were more likely to discrimi
nate "because of the smallness of the enterprises and the lack of sophisticated person
nel techniques." 118·CONG. REC. 581 (1972), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 641, 646.
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effective [f]ederal remedy to redress employment discrimination."71
The House Judiciary Committee felt "that the [EEOC's] remedial
power should also be available to all segments of the work force."72
There is little evidence in the legislative history of Title VII to
establish how far Congress intended to stretch the definition of
"employer."73 With the passage of the Equal Employment Oppor
tunity Act of 197274 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,75 however,
Congress clearly intended to broaden the scope of TItle VII in or
der to give a greater number of victims more substantial legal
remedies.76
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted to "provide mone
tary remedies for victims of intentional employment discrimination
to compensate them for resulting injuries and to provide more ef
fective deterrence."77 The Act allows employees to recover com
71. H.R. REp. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972
u.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2155.
72. Id.
73. In 1964, Senator Joseph Clark, when asked a question on who qualifies as an
employer under Title VII; responded that the term "employer" should be given its com
mon dictionary meaning. 110 CONGo REc. 7216 (1964) .
. "Employer" is defined to include the following options: 1) the owner of an enter
prise ("as a business or manufacturing firm"); or 2) "an agent acting for such an enter
prise in employing persons." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
743 (1976) (emphasis added).
74. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108 &
5314 and various sections of 42 U.S.c. § 2000e); see supra note 67 and accompanying
text.
75. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in various sections
of 2 U.S.c., 29 U.S.C., and42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e). For a comparison with the
Civil Rights Act of 1990 that was vetoed by President Bush, see The Committee on
Federal Legislation, The Civil Rights Act of 1991,48 REc. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 75 (1993); J.R. Franke, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Remedial
Civil Rights Policies Prevail, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 267 (1993). For a review of issues left
unresolved by the 1991 Act, see Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 921 (1993). For other articles discussing vari
ous aspects of Title VII, see Symposium, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Theory and Prac
tice, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 911 (1993); Symposium, The Civil Rights Act of 1991:
.
Unraveling the Controversy, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 887 (1993).
76. For a section-by-section analysis of the damages provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, see Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC En
forcement, 23 STETSON L. REv. 53 (1993).
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned a number of United States Supreme Court
decisions that had restrictively interpreted Title VII. See, e.g., Eric Schnapper, Statu
tory Misinterpretations: A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1095 (1993).
77. H.R. REp. No. 40(1), l02d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552. In testimony before the Committee on Education and Labor,
one witness noted:
[C)ompensatory and punitive damages will not give back to a plaintiff, in many
cases, the career that they lost or the ability to rise further in that career.
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pensatory78 and punitive79 damages from employers for acts of
discrimination. 80 As the House Report states, the Act was intended
to supply the same damages as awarded under 42 U.S.c. § 1981.81
Similar to Title VII, "employer" is defined under the ADEA as
"a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
twenty or more employees ... : The term also means (1) any agent
of such a person."82. Most commentators conclude that Congress
patterned the ADEA's definition after Title VII's "employer" defi
nition,83 as opposed to the defiriition of "employer" under the
FLSA.84
Congress doesn't have the ability to do that. Its [sic] a lasting permanent dam
age. I think what the increased remedies under the bill will do, however, is
primarily act as a deterrent.
H.R. REP. No. 40(1) at 69, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 607.
78. 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(2) & (3) (Supp. V 1993) .
. 79. 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(I) (Supp. V 1993).
80. Section 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D) limits the amount of recovery depending on the
size of the employer. For example, if an employer has between 15 and 100 employees
for 20 weeks out of the year, the employer can be held liable for no more than $50,000.
42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993). If the employer has between 100 and 200
employees, the employer can be held liable for no more than $100,000. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
Amendments have already been introduced in both the House and Senate to elimi
nate these caps on damages. S. 2062, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R. 3975, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); see also S. 2053, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (amendment would
remove caps on employers with over 50 employees).
81. H.R. REP. No. 40(11), l02d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N.717. The Judicial Committee report stated: "The Committee intends that
compensatory damages be awarded under Title VII using the same standards that have
been applied under [§] 1981." Id. at 28-29. Moreover, the standard for punitive dam
ages was taken "directly from civil rights case law," including 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42
U.S.c. § 1983 cases. Id. at 29.
.
82. 29 U.S.c. § 630(b) (1988). The complete definition of "employer" under the
ADEA is as follows:
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding calendar year: Provided, That prior to June 30, 1968,
employers having fewer than fifty employees shall not be considered employ
ers. The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or
political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or
a political subdivision of a State, and any inte.rstate agency, but such term does
not include the United States, or a corporation wholly owned by the Govern
ment of the United States.
Id.
83. SCHLEI AND GROSSMAN, supra note 65, at 483 n.9; Monte B. Lake, ADEA: A
Review o/the Substantive Requirements, in AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT Acr
I, 5 (Monte Lake ed., 1982). See supra note 66 which provides the definition of "em
ployer" under Title VII.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1988). "Employer" is defined under the FLSA to be "any
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D. Imposition of Personal Liability Under Title VII and the
ADEA
In addressing the issue of personal liability for supervisors,
courts have interpreted the "employer" definitions of TItle VII and
the ADEA in two different ways. Some courts have interpreted
"agents" to be "employers," and, thus, subject to liability. Other
courts have found the agent provision simply. to be a means of es
tablishing respondeat superior liability or direct liability85 on the
employer based on ageqcy principles. 86
1.

"Agents" Are "Employers"

Courts that have· found agents (i.e. supervisors)87 to be em
ployers have done so based on the plain reading of the statutory
definition of employer. However, most courts have limited
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an em
.
ployee." Id.
85. In Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987), the
court found respondeat superior liability linked to the employer where "the person who
engaged in the allegedly unlawful sexual harassment was not the plaintiffs statutory
'employer'" and direct liability where the pe.rson engaging in the harassment would be
an agent and thus an "employer." Id. at 1558 n.4.
86. In Friend v. Union Dime Sav. Bank, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1307,
1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), a district court came up with yet another interpretation of TItle
VII's "employer" definition based on the NLRA definition of "employer." The court
cited a 1947 amendment to the NLRA that restricted the employer definition. Id.
Compare ch. 372, § 2, 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) (defining employer as "any person acting
in the interest of an employer"), with ch. 120, § 101,61 Stat. 136, 137 (1947) (defining
employer as "any person acting as an agent of the employer."). The Friend Court stated
that "when Congress included 'any agent' in the NLRA it ~as an attempt to limit the
employer's liability rather than to grant a new cause of action against all agents or
employees of an employer." 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1310.
The House Report to the NLRA amendment stated that the reason for the change
was that under the prior definition, the employer was being held responsible for em
ployees "not acting within the scope of any authority from the employer, real or appar
ent." H.R. REp. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st SeSs., reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.S. 1135, 1137.
Other courts have also looked to the NLRA definition in interpreting "employer"
under TItle VII. Rivas v. Federacion de Asociaciones Pecuarias de Puerto Rico, 929
F.2d 814, 820 n.15 (1st Cir. 1991); ct. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 226 n.8
(1982) (finding remedial provision ofTItle VII modeled after the NLRA).
87. Generally, supervisors are only held liable for their own harassing acts. Occa
sionally, however, a court will find a supervisor liable if an employee's co-workers cre
ate a "hostile work environment." See Hail v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1016 (8th
Cir. 1988) (holding that supervisor was aware of numerous incidents of harassment and
therefore was liable for failing to take adequate steps to prevent it); Robson v. Eva's
Super Mkt., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 857, 863 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (finding supervisor liable
under TItle VII for refusing to take action in response to plaintiffs complaints of har
assment by co-workers).
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"agents"88 to include only those people who serve "in a supervisory
position and exercise[ ] significant control over the plaintiffs hiring,
firing, or conditions of employment,"89 or who have "participated
in the decision-making process that forms the basis of the
discrimination. "90
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit used the former
definition of "agent" in Paroline v. Unisys Corp.91 In Paroline, the
plaintiff brought a Title VII claim against both her corporate em
ployer and her individual supervisor, alleging sexual harassment by
the supervisor. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that the supervisor could be an employer for purposes of liability.92
"[A]s long as he or she has significant input into ... personnel deci
sions," the supervisor is deemed to have "significant control" over
the employee. 93 The supervisor in Paroline. participated in
88. Courts have generally been unwilling to find co-workers liable under Title VII
for acts of discrimination. Guyette v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 521, 525-26
(D.N.J. 1981); 1 LARSON, supra note 20, § S.03[2][a], at 5-35 to 5-36.
89. Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part on
reh'g, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Williams v. City of Montgomery, 742 F.2d
586,589 (11th Cir. 1984) ('''Where the employer has delegated control of some of the
employer's traditional rights, such as hiring and firing, to a third party, the third party
has been found to be an 'employer' by virtue of.the agency relationship."') (quoting
SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 65, at 1002), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053 (1985); York
v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1982) (construing an
"agent" to be "a supervisory or managerial employee to whom employment decisions
have been delegated by the employer").
90. Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Jones v.
Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal Dist. No.1, 537 F. Supp. 966, 970 (D. Colo.
1982». In Hamilton, a firefighter alleging racial harassment brought a Title VII claim
against the fire department and his immediate supervisors. Id. The district court deter
mined that the supervisors tried to "freeze out" Hamilton by refusing to provide assist
ance at radio operation, denying him car assignments and assigning him to the night
shift. Id. at 442. Interpreting Title VII liberally, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, noting that the supervisors had authority
over Hamilton and that they used this authority to Hamilton's detriment. Id. at 442-43.
"To hold otherwise would encourage supervisory personnel to believe that they may
violate Title VII with impunity." Id. at 443.
In Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1990), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit abrogated Hamilton to the extent that agents can be held liable only in their
"official" capacity. Id. at 228 n.2.
91. 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part on reh'g, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.
1990). For a review of the Paroline decision, see Becky Leamon, Note, Employers'
Liability for Failure to Prevent Sexual Harassment, 55 Mo. L. REv. 803 (1990).
92. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to
show that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the supervisor's status as em
ployer; thus, the district court's granting of summary judgment was inappropriate. Id.
93. Id. (construing Tafoya v. Adams, 612 F. Supp. 1097, 1105 (D. Colo. 1985),
affd 816 F.2d 555 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851 (1987». The court suggested
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Paroline's interview, recommended her for hire, and gave her work
assignments. 94 Although he was not Paroline's "formally desig
nated" supervisor, he had enough authority over Paroline to be
considered her supervisor.95
A number of the United States courts of appeals that have
found individual defendants to be agents have held these defend
ants liable only in their "official" capacity.96 However, several of
these decisions relate only to suits against government officials. In
Barger v. Kansas,97 for example, the court held that the liability of
state university administrators must be limited to acts within the
scope of their "official" capacity.98 The Barger court further noted
that it was "highly unlikely" that the "official capacity" rule would
ever work to deny a plaintiff an award of backpay.99
In other cases, courts have distinguished ADEA claims against
that the supervisor does not have to have the "ultimate authority to hire or fire to
qualify as an employer." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The court stated:
[A]n employee may exercise supervisory authority over the plaintiff for Title
VII purposes even though the company has formally designated another indi
vidual as the plaintiffs supervisor. As long as the' company's management
approves or acquiesces in the employee's exercise of supervisory control over
the plaintiff, that employee will hold "employer" status for Title VII purposes.
Id.
96. See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122,1125 n.3 (10th Cir. 1993); Harvey
v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1990); York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n,
684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1982); Clanton v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 649 F.2d 1084,
1099 n.19 (5th Cir. 1981); cf. Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690
n.55 (1978) (holding that "[o]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another way
of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent"); see also fitzpat
rick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456-57 (1976) (determining that the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar backpay award against state officials); Yeldell v. Cooper Green Hosp.,
Inc., 956 F.2d 1056, 1060 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding that suits against government officials
may be brought against them in their official capacity); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931
F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that suits could be brought against a municipal
officer only in his or her official capacity).
Other courts have specifically rejected the officiaUindividual distinction. See, e.g:,
Hanshaw v. Delaware Tech. & Community College, 405 F. Supp. 292, 296 n.10 (D. Del.
1975) ("Persons acting as officials are liable for their tortious actions as individuals;
their official capacity relates only to potential immunity for certain kinds of discretion
ary decisions for which they might otherwise be liable.").
97. 630 F. Supp. 88 (D. Kan. 1985).
98. Id. at 90-92. "Only when the official is working in his official capacity can he
be said to be an 'agent' of the government or governmental agency, and therefore an
'employer' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)." Id. at 92.
99. Id. Courts have also found individuals liable in their official capacity in light
of the compensatory and punitive damages provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
In Stefanski v. R.A. Zehetner & Assoc., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Wis. 1994), the
court found that the statutory damage caps limit the amount of compensatory damages
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individual supervisors from similar claims made unde~ TItle VII.
Although the ADEA definition of employer is generally. considered
to parallel the TItle VII definition,lOO courts have found individual
liability under the ADEA based on the remedies and procedures of
the FLSA that Congress incorporated into the AbEA.lO!
.
Two cases demonstrate this method of establishing individual
liability under the ADEA.102 In House v. Cannon MilLS Co. ,ip3 the
court accepted the Court of AppeaJs for the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Padway v. Palches 104 with regard to TItle VII cases, but found
that the Padway ra~ionale does not apply to ADEA claims.lOS. The
House court noted that the damages provided under the ADEA
were "much broader" than those which existed under TItle Vp at
that time. 106 Furthermore, since the ADEA incorporated the
"remedies and. procedures" of the FLSA,107 this "evidences a con
gressional intent to adopt existing interpretations of FLSA
provisions."108
In addition, the court in House cited cases imposing individual
liability under the FLSA, both when the ADEA was initially enbased on the number of employees the "respondent" has, and "an employee in his or
her individual capacity does not have any [employees]." Id. at 1032.
100. See, ~.g., Friend v, Union Dime Sav. Bank, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), discussed supra at note 86. Nevertheless, courts have been able
to find distinctions in the two definitions. See generally, e.g., Court v. Admin. Office of
the Third Jud. Dist., Salt Lake County, 764 F. Supp. 168, 170 (D. Utah 1991) (finding
that the ADEA definition of employer does not include agents of states or state agen
cies, but Title VII's definition does include such agents).
101. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
102. House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Wanamaker
v. Columbian Rope Co., 740 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Elias v. Sitomer, 60
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 758, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying the reasoning of
House and Wanamaker to hold officer of company personally liable under the ADEA).
Judge Fletcher also based her dissent on this distinction in Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l,
Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1993) (Fletcher, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom.
Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994); see infra notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
103. 713 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
104. 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982); see infra note 117.
105. House, 713 F. Supp. at 160.
106. Id. Although House was decided prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it is
still accepted that the ADEA provisions are broader than Title VII's because the
amount of compensatory damages available under Title VII are apportioned according
to the size of the employer. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589 n.1 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). Com
pare 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1993) and 42
U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 582 (1978).
108. House, 713 F. Supp. at 160 (citing Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d
1292, 1296 (4th Cir. 1979».
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acted 109 and at the time it was amended in 1978. 110 This suggests
that Congress, assumedly aware of the findings of individual liabil
ity under the FLSA, would have amended the ADEA if it did not
intend for the Act to create individual liability. 111 Absent clear leg
islative intent to the contrary, the court held that the "express lan
guage of the statute" suggests that "agents" are "employers," and
"employers" who violate section 623 are liable for damages under
section- 626. 112
In Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co. ,113 the court followed
the Ho'use approach by analogizing to the FLSA to find individual
liability. under the ADEA.114 '''[L]iability [under the FLSA] is
predicated not on the existence of the employer-employee relation
ship between [the supervisor] and the employee but on the acts he
performs in relation to the employee. "'115 The court found that the
plaintiff properly stated a claim under the ADEA on the basis that
the complaint alleged that all of the defendants "participated in the
decision making process."116

2.

Respondeat Superior

Some courts have found that neither Title VII nor the ADEA
were ever intended to permit individual liability, and the sole pur
pose of the "agent" provision was to impose respondeat superior
109. Id. (citing Chambers Constr. Co. v. Mitchell, 233 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1956);
Brennan v. Community Servo Soc'y of N.Y., 45 N.Y.S.2d 825 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943».
110. Id. (citing Shultz v. Chalk-Fitzgerald Constr. Co., 309 F. Supp. 1255, 1257 (D.
Mass. 1970); Hodgson v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 324 F. Supp. 342, 347 (D. Miss.
1970), affd, 465 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1972); Brennan v. Whatley, 432 F. Supp. 465, 469
(E.D. Tex. 1977); Usery v. Weiner Bros., Inc., 70 F.R.D. 615,617 (D. Conn. 1976».
The House court also cited more recent cases: Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co.,
695 F.2d 190, 194-95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Alberding v. Donovan, 463 U.S.
1207 (1983); Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1510-11 (1st Cir. 1983). House, 713 F.
Supp. at 161 n.2.
111. House, 713 F. Supp. at 160.
112. Id. at 161-62.
113. 740 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
114. Id. at 135. The Wanamaker court reiterated that "the substantive prohibi
tions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII." Id. at 134 (internal
quotes omitted). Unfortunately, the court in Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F.
Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), cited the above-mentioned statement in finding that the
precedent set in Wanamaker of individual liability under the ADEA was "instructive in
interpreting Title VII." Id. at 1180.
115. Wanamaker, 740 F. Supp. at 135 (quoting Shultz v. Chalk-Fitzgerald Constr.
Co., 309 F. Supp. 1255,1257 (D. Mass. 1970) (emphasis added».
116. Id. (quoting Bostock v. Rappleyea, 629 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (N.D.N.Y.
1985».
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liability onto the employer. 117 In support of this holding, these
courts have stated that the definition's requirement that an em
ployer have a certain minimum number of employees (fifteen for
Title Vn,11s twenty for the ADEA119) suggests that Congress did
not intend to burden "small entities."12o
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Grant v. Lone
Star CO.121 found that individuals are not liable under Title VII's
damages provisions. "Among the various parties subject to liability
[under Title VII's damages provision], Congress could have made
the individual employee committing or engaging in the dis~rimina
tory acts liable for damages. It did not."122 Because "Congress has
proscribed conduct, by 'persons'. in other statutory schemes," the
Grant court held that "Congress did not intend to impose individual
liability for ba~kpay damages under Title VII."l23
The district courts have offered various rationales for applying
respondeat superior liability.124 For example, the court in Saville v.
Houston County Healthcare Authority 125 analyzed the issue of indi
vidual liability in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. First, the
court noted that because the amount of damages available under
the 1991 damages provisions is based on the size of the employer,
117. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Padway v. Palches,
665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982), has been cited regularly in more recent decisions that have
found against individual liability under Title VII. In Padway, the plaintiff brought suit
under Title VII seeking compensatory and punitive damages against a school superin
tendent and five members of the Board of Trustees in their individual and official ca
pacities. Id. at 966. The Padway court first noted that individuals cannot be held liable
for backpay because Title VII "speaks of unlawful practices by the employer, and not of
unlawful practices' by officers or employees of the employer." Id: at 968. The court
went on to note that Title VII did not provide for compensatory or punitive damages
(as of 1982 when Padway was decided). Id.
This decision is weak precedent, however, because of the opinion's lack of analysis
on the issue. See infra note 167.
118. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b) (1988). See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988). See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
120. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied
sub nom. Miller V. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994); see also Birbeck V. Marvel Lighting
Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510-11 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding respondeat superior appiies under
the ADEA to actions of personnel supervisors).
121. 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).
122. Id. at 653.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Lowry V. Clark, 843 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Ky. 1994). In discussing the
applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Lowry court stated that Congress could
have eradicated discrimination by not limiting monetary damages and by removing the
restrictions on employer size; instead, Congress "chose a more conservative path." Id.
at 231.
.
.
125. 852 F. Supp. 1512 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
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supervisors who make the same salary and engage in the same dis
criminatory activity could be held liable for largely disproportionate
damage amounts depending upon the size of their employer. 126
Second, the Saville court reasoned that if Congress had intended to
permit individual liability, it "would have provided some guidance
as to how damages should be apportioned, or, whether a plaintiff
could collect the cap amount from both the employer and the
individual."127
An insightful argument for respondeat superior was made by
the court in Johnson v. Northern Indiana Public Service 'CO.l28 In
Johnson, the court interpreted the statute to incorporate respon
deat superior liability beca. 'se the definition of "employer" used
the conjunction "and," rath( than "or," in the phrase "and any
court commented that the "[u]se of
agent of such a person."129
the word 'and' ... ties the 'any agent of such a person' language to
the previous language in the statute, suggesting that the 'agent' lan
guage was not meant to stand alone in terms of defining an 'em
ployer' under the statute."130 However, if the word "or" was
drafted into the "any agent" clause, then the clause "could stand
alone so that an e~ployer would be defined to include any agent of
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has [fif
teen] or more employees."131

The

3.

DirectLiability

~ourts

have utilized agency principles based on the "agent"
clause to find employers directly liable for the actions of their su
pervisors. 132 The United States Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings
126. Id.; accord Vodde v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., 852 F. Supp. 676, 681
(N.D. Ind. 1994) (finding that "[i]t is unlikely that Congress ... intended such a 'crazy
quilt' scheme of liability" as to impose disparate scales of damages on supervisors per
forming similar duties).
127. Saville, 852 F. Supp. at 1525. The court concluded that if "Congress [had]
intended individual liability, it would not have left these questions unanswered and
would have incorporated individual liability into the damage limitation scheme in some
manner, perhaps by establishing individual damage caps." Id.
128. 844 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
129. Id. at 469.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1558-60 (11th Cir.
1987); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 634-36 (6th Cir; 1987); see also Griffith v.
Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 858 F. Supp. 802, 806 (C.D. Ill. 1994) (finding individuals
liable based on the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 359c(1) (1958». See infra
notes 239-47 and accompanying text for an analysis on the applicability of agency
principles.
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Bank, FSB v. Vinson,133 stated that by including the term "agent"
within the definition of employer, Congress intended courts to look
to common-law agency principles in determining employer
lia bility.13 4
In Meritor, the plaintiff brought a sex discrimination claim
against her supervisor and the bank that employed her. 135 The
Court did, not specifically address the issue of the individual liability
of the supervisor;136 rather, the Court determined when employers
could be held liable for the acts of their agents.137 The Court stated
that the incorporation of the agent provision "surely evinces an in
tent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which em
ployers under TItle VII are to be held responsible."138 Therefore,
the Meritor Court held that employers cannot always be found lia
ble under TItle VII for their supervisors' actions.139
Applying agency principles, the Court of Appeals for the Elev
enth Circuit in Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. 140 determined
that a supervisor was all agent of an employer '''where [the] super
133. 477 u.s. 57 (1986).
134. Id. 'at 72. The Supreme Court conceded that "such common-law principles
may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII," but Congress nevertheless
intended them to apply. 'Id. For general criticism of the Meritor Court's directive to
apply agency principles, see Rachel ,E. Lutner; Employer Liability for Sexual Harass
ment: The Morass of Agency Principles and Respondeat Superior, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv.
589 (1993).
135. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
136. The respondent barely addressed the issue of the supervisor's liability in her
brief. See Brief for Respondent at 32-33 & n.10, Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979) ("Mr. Taylor's individual liability for his act as the em
ployer is not entirely clear under TItle VII, although it would be most peculiar to found
[sic) liability as an agent in one whose principal was not jointly and severally liable.").
Meritor Savings Bank did not address the supervisor's liability in its brief, and the
amici curiae briefs on behalf of both sides also did not discuss the issue.
At least one commentator has suggested the Meritor decision affirms individual
liability of supervisors. See 1 SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at § 8.7.4 ("[A)s the [Meritor]
majority opinion suggests, the harassers are themselves liable because they remain
agents of the employer and therefore are 'employers' within the meaning of TItle
VII.").
137. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69-73. The Meritor decision suggests that particularly
egregious forms of discrimination that the institutional employer adequately sought to
prevent would not subject that employer to liability. Unfortunately, in this situation the
supervisor also could not be liable under Title VII, because the supervisor's conduct
would not be within the course of his or her agency. ,See Kandel, supra note 6, at pt.
XIII (discussing liability gap when employers attempt to distance themselves from out
rageous conduct of their employees); contra EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c)
(1993), quoted at infra note 14l.
138. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
139. Id.
140. 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987).
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visor exercises the authority actually delegated to him by his em
ployer, by making or threatening to make decisions affecting the
employment status of his subordinates."'141 Since the supervisor in
Sparks had "actual and apparent authority to alter Sparks' employ
ment status," and allegedly used this authority to harass Sparks, the
supervisor could be considered an agent. 142
II.

A.

MILLER V. MAXWELL'S INTERNATIONAL, INc 143

FaCts and Procedure of Case

Phyllis Miller took a position as hostess at Maxwell's Plum
Restaurant in August 1982.144 During her employment, Miller al
leged that her supervisors engaged in a series of harassing and dis
criminatory acts, including reduction of her hours, unequal pay,145
harassing comments about her age and sex,146 and, eventually, three
terminations.
Soon after Miller filed a complaint with her union, she was
141. Id. at 1559 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70). The Sparks court determined
that by finding a supervisor to be an agent of the employer, the employer is directly
liable for the actions of the supervisor. Id. The court quotes the REsrATEMENT (SEC
OND) OF AGENCY § 219(d)(2) (1958), which establishes the master's liability for the acts
of its servants when "the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal
and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the
tort by the. existence of the agency relation." Id. (emphasis added); see also EEOC
Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1993), stating:
[A]n employer ... is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and super
visory. employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the
specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the em
ployer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of
their occurrence. The Commission will examine the circumstances of the par
ticular employment relationship and the job junctions [sic] performed by the
individual \n determining whether an individual acts in either a supervisory or
agency capacity.
Id.
142. Sparks, 830 F.2d at 1559-60. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
a!Xordingly overturned the summary judgment in favor of Pilot Freight Carriers, since
the supervisor's status as agent was Ii genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 1560.
143. 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S.
Ct.1049 (1994):
144. [d. at 584.
145. [d. Miller claims to have managed the "Terrace Garden" in the spring and
summer of 1983, although she was paid only hostess wages for her work. [d.
146. [d. Miller alleges that her general managers, Dino La Rosa and Carlo
Galazio, on several ocCasions made comments that she was too old or that she would
not be promoted because she was a woman. Miller v. La Rosa, No. C-B7-1906-VRW,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 1990). After her first reinstate
ment, Miller alleges Galazzo threatened her that she would have a "hard time" if she
returned to work. [d. at *5.
.
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fired by her general manager, Dino La Rosa.1 47 She filed charges
with the EEOC and the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB").148 Although she was reinstated,149 her supervisors de
nied her a full working schedule. She subsequently filed another
NLRB charge, and Maxwell's fired her a second time nine days
later. 150 She followed up with a second EEOC charge. 151 Miller
was later reinstated, for a short time, but was terminated in the
spring of 1986. 152
Miller claimed that her general manager, Carlo Galazzo, and
the CEO of Maxwell's, Donald Schupak, withheld her unemploy
ment benefits in the spring of 1986.153 Miller received a right-to-sue
letter from the EEOC on January 24, 1987.154
Miller filed a pro se claim155 in the district court for the North
ern District of California on April 24, 1987, against six defendants
in their individual capacities: Donald Schupak, chief executive of
ficer of Maxwell's International;156 Dino La Rosa, general manager
of Maxwell's Plum until 1985; Carlo Galazzo, general manager after
1985;157 Don Bohn, comptroller and assistant general manager; and
147. Id. Miller alleges that La Rosa terminated her because of her age and in
retaliation for her requesting union intervention on the issue of the reduction of her
hours. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. Maxwell's reinstated Miller with backpay following the union's arbitra
tion hearings. Id.
150. Miller, 991 F.2d at 584.
151. [d.
152. [d. Miller claimed that her third termination was based on retaliation, age
discrimination and sex discrimination. Id. Miller further alleged that after her third
termination, her general manager, Carlo Galazzo, informed a third party that Miller
was the owner of the restaurant. This allegedly resulted in a suit against Miller by a
former employee for back wages. La Rosa, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803, at *6,
153. Miller, 991 F.2d at 584. An unemployment appeals board hearing followed,
in which Miller alleges that three lower level supervisors at Maxwell's gave false testi
mony regarding her. Miller alleged in her complaint that the unemployment appeals
judge ruled that her third termination was wrongful. La Rosa, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7803, at *6-7.
154. La Rosa, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803, at *7. This letter was sent on Decem
ber 30, 1986, upon Miller's request, based on her 1984 and 1985 EEOC charges. [d.
Miller claims that she did not receive this letter until January 24, 1987. Id.
155. Id. Miller apparently received some legal assistance out of court, however.
Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1486 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
156. Miller, 991 F.2d at 584. Miller alleged that Schupak, as CEO, had sole re
sponsibility over the discriminatory actions of the general managers involved. La Rosa,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803, at *7. The district court dismissed all of the claims against
Schupak on the basis that Miller alleged insufficient facts to necessitate relief. Id. at *9.
157. Miller, 991 F.2d at 584. Miller alleged that La Rosa and Galazzo retaliated
against her by "reducing her hours, refusing to promote her, ... denying [her] culinary
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Bui Duc Huy and Robert Stewart, dining room directors. 15S Miller
was allowed to amend her complaint three times I59 before it was
dismissed. 1OO
In deciding the issue of individual liability under Title VII and
the ADEA, both Judge Schwarzer in his January 17, 1990 decision,
and Judge Walker in his decision to dismiss, stated that the supervi
sors could be sued in their individual capacities if sufficient claims
of discrimination were alleged against them. 16I
training ... , writing false letters about [her] job performance, and otherwise harassing
her." La Rosa, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803, at *4. The district court dismissed the
claims against La Rosa because he was not named in the original EEOC charge, thus
denying him the opportunity to assemble the necessary material for this action. Id. at
*22. The court also dismissed the claims against Galazzo because Miller failed to prop
erly state a cla4n for retaliation. Id. at *23-24.
158. Miller, 991 F.2d at 584. Miller alleged that Bohn, Huy, and Stewart notified
her of her first termination, falsely testified in her EEOC hearings, and retaliated by
failing to give her letters of recommendation. La Rosa, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803, at
*8-11. The district court dismissed these claims based on Miller's failure to allege suffi
cient facts on which to grant relief. [d. at *10-11.
159. Miller's initial complaints alleged sex and age discrimination, wrongful ter
mination, retaliation, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negli
gent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, and violation of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Miller v. Galazzo, No. C-87
1906-WWS, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17034, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 1989). District
Judge Schwarzer granted Miller leave to file an amended complaint with a short plain
statement of her specific claims against the individual defendants. Id. at *2.
Her second amended complaint was hardly improved. Miller, 52 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 1486 (complaint was "clutter[ed] ... with pejorative, argumentative and
irrelevant assertions"). Judge Schwarzer allowed Miller to amend her claims of sex and
age discrimination, infliction of emotional distress, and retaliation a third time; the
other claims were dismissed. Id. at 1486-88.
160. La Rosa, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803, at *24-25.
161. Miller, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1486 (Schwarzer, J.); La Rosa, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803 (Walker, J.). In his January 17, 1990, decision, Judge Schwarzer
determined that claims could be brought against individual supervisors under Title VII
and the ADEA. Miller, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1487. First, Judge
Schwarzer distinguished Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982), because
Padway involved a claim against a school superintendent, not a suit against a private
employer. Additionally, Padway gave only a cursory analysis of the individual liability
issue. Id.; see supra note 117 for a discussion of Padway. Second, Judge Schwarzer
determined that although "it is unlikely that Congress intended to impose personallia
bility on employees," the text of Title VII did not preclude individual liability. Miller,
" 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1487.
Judge Walker, in dismissing Miller's final complaint, reinforced Judge Schwarzer's
reasoning that individual supervisors could be held liable. La Rosa, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7803, at *2 n.1. Judge Walker noted that even though a settlement with a princi
pal generally operates as a settlement with the agents, such is not the case when the
"evidence shows the plaintiff intended a contrary result. [d. (citing Transpac Constr. Co.
v. Clark & Groff Eng'rs, Inc., 466 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1972». Miller "repeatedly
sought assurances from the [bankruptcy] judge that she would be able to continue this
action against the individual defendants." Id. Nevertheless, Judge Walker found that
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Majority Opinion in Miller 162

After addressing the jurisdictional issues and Miller's other
claims,163 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined
that individual defendants could not be held personally liable under
either Title VII or the ADEA.l64 The court first established that
Title VII and the ADEA have the same liability schemes; "they
both limit civil liability to the employer."165 Citing Padway v.
Palches,166 the court stated that because civil liability was assessed
only to the employer under Title VII, individual defendants could
not be held liable for backpay.167
The court recognized that some courts have held individual de
fendants liable to Title VII claimants,168 but the majority concluded
that many of these courts "held individuals liable only in their offiMiller did not provide sufficient evidence to support her claim against the individual
defendants. See supra notes 156-58.
162. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub
nom. Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).
163. Although Miller failed to file a timely appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit heard Miller's claim due. to the "unique circumstances" created by the
district court's erroneous order for extension of time to request alteration or amend
ment of the district court judgment. Id. at 585 (citing Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324,
1329 (9th Cir. 1987».
The Miller court further determined that Miller' alleged sufficient willful conduct
for her ADEA claim to have been accorded the three-year statute of limitations, in
stead of the two-year limitation imposed by the district court. Id. at 586. The court also
held that the district court erred in barring the remainder of Miller's ADEA claim
under the defense of laches because Congress provided a statute of limitations to apply
to the action. Id. (citing Int'ITel. & Tel. Corp. v. GTE, 518 F.2d 913, 926 (9th Cir.
1975».
.
Miller's emotional distress claims were barred by California's one-year statute of
limitations. Id.; see Cal. Civ. Proc'. Code § 340(3) (West Supp. 1994).
164. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587-88.
165. Id. at 587. The court pointed out ·that when origi~ally instituted, TItle VII
only allowed for backpay and reinstatement of employment, while the ADEA allowed
liquidated damages for willful conduct. Id. With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Congress made compensatory and punitive damages available under TItle VII.
See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
166. 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982); see supra note 117 for a discussion of the
Padway decision.
.
.
167. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587. John Pemberton, Jr., the regional district attorney of
the EEOC who followed the Miller case, stated that his office considered the Padway
decision "gratuitous dictum." His research showed that the parties did not even brief
the individual liability issue in PadwaY. Steven G. Hirsch, Job Bias Victims Can't Sue
Managers, THE RECORDER, Apr. 20, 1993.
168. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587 (citing Hamilton V. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442-43 (5th
Cir. 1986), limited by Harvey V. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1990»; cf. Barger
V. Kansas, 630 F. Supp. 88, 90-92 (D. Kan. 1985).
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cial capacities."169 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
adopted the district court's rationale 170 that the purpose of includ
ing "agents'; within the employer definition was to incorporate re
spondeat superior liability into Title VII.l7l
The majority opinion further noted that the statutory scheme
of the two acts sugge~ts that Congress did not intend to impose indi
vidual liability on employees. l72 . Because both Title VII and the
ADEA limit liability to employers with more than a certain number
of employees,173 the court inferred that Congress did not intend "to
burden small entities with the. costs associated with litigating dis
crimination claims."174 As a result of this limitation, Congress
could not have intended' to impose civil liability on individual
employees. 175
The court concluded that even though Padway was decided
prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,176 it is still good
law,117 and it is applicable to both the Title VII and the ADEA
claimsP8 In addition, the majority refuted the statement made by
169. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587 (citing Harvey, 913 F.2d at 227-28 & n.2; Barger, 630
F. Supp. at 91-92; York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir.
1982».
170. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1486, 1487 (N.D.
Cal. 1990).
171. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
172. Id.
173. TItle VII applies only to employers engaged in an industry affecting com
merce with 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988); see supra note 66 for
the text of this section.
The ADEA limits liability to those "persons" with 20 or more employees. 29
U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988); see supra note 82.
174. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
175. Id.
176. Pub. L. No. 102-166,105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in various sections
of 2 U.S.c., 29 U.S.c., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e). The majority noted that
because Congress specifically limited the damages available under the new Act depend
ing upon the employer's size, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D), and because Con
gress did not include "individuals" within the statute's limitations, presumably Congress
did not intend to impose liability on individuals. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587-88 n.2.
177. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587-88 n.2. Judge Fletcher, in dissent, conceded that indi
vidual employees could not be held liable for backpay under TItle VII prior to the Act's
amendment, but inferred that individuals may be held personally liable for compensa
tory and punitive damages in cases where the discrimination was intentional. Id. at 589
(Fletcher, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 587-88. In a footnote, the majority disputed the dissent's argument
that the liability schemes under TItle VII and the ADEA should not be interpreted
similarly. According to the court, the arguments put forth in House v. Cannon Mills
Co., 713 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1988), upon which the dissent relied, are not persua
sive because: (1) the Civil Rights Act of 1991 made available compensatory and puni
tive damages, which had distinguished the ADEA from TItle VII when House was
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the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hamilton v. Rodgers179
that employees will "believe that they may violate Title VII with
impunity."18o The majority further noted that the scope of Hamil
ton was limited by the Fifth Circuit's decision "four years later in
Harvey v. Blake. 181
C.

Judge Fletcher's Dissent I82

Although Judge Fletcher disapproved of the majority's holding
regarding individual liability under Title VII,183 she was neverthe
less hesitant to reject the court's reasoning. l84 Judge Fletcher asdecided; and (2) although the ADEA incorporates some provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988), it does not incorporate the "employer"
definition into the ADEA. Miller, 991 F.2d at 588 n.3.
179. 791 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1986). See supra note 90 for a discussion of the Ham
ilton decision.
180. Miller, 991 F.2d at 588 (citing Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 443). The majority fur
ther stated:
[T]he [Hamilton] court's reasoning is unsound. No employer will allow super
visory or other personnel to violate Title VII when the employer is liable for
the Title VII violation. An employer that has incurred civil damages because
one of its employees believes he can violate Title VII with impunity ~ill
quickly correct that employee's erroneous belief.
Id.
Accord Vodde v. Indiana Mich. Power Co., 852 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ind. 1994). In
Vodde, the court opined that "the normally deep-pocketed and publicity conscious em
ployer (in general contrast to the ordinary supervisory employee bent on pursuing some
private agenda) can be counted upon to be the most effective guardian of the market
place." Id. at 681.
181. 913 F.2d 226, 228 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990); see supra note 90.
182. Miller, 991 F.2d at 588.
183. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589. "I am concerned that the majority's overbroad lan
guage may unnecessarily cloud decisionmaking under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ....
This significant revision may permit suits against individuals for compensatory and pu
nitive damages where the discrimination was intentional." Id. (citations omitted).
Judge Fletcher also cited cases that allowed individual defendants to be sued in
their official capacity for injunctive relief. Id. at 588 (citing Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d
226,227-28 (5th Cir. 1990); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1557-59
(11th Cir. 1987); Canada v. Boyd Group, Inc~, 809 F. Supp. 771, 779 & n.3 (D. Nev.
1992); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 772 F. Supp. 407, 410-11 (N.D. Ill. 1991».
Interestingly, the majority also used the "individual in official capacity" argument
to buttress the assertion that the purpose' of the "agent" provision was to incorporate
respondeat superior liability into Title VII. Id. at 587.
184. Id. at 589. Judge Fletcher cited 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(3), which limits the
damages for which an employer can be held liable, depending on the number of em
ployees. In light of these damage limitations, Judge Fletcher was uncertain about the
effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in regards to the issue of individual liability under
Title VII. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589. Nevertheless, Judge Fletcher implied that Padway
should not be applied to claims occurring after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, because when Padway was decided, only backpay and reinstatement were avail
able as remedies under Title VII. Id.
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serted that the ADEA liability scheme is different from the liability
scheme of TItle VII. Therefore, the court should have analyzed the
individual liability issue under the ADEA separately from the TItle
VII issue. 185 Citing House v. Cannon Mills CO.,186 Judge Fletcher
presented two notable differences between the two statutes. First,
when the ADEA was enacted, the scope of relief under this act was
much broader than the relief available under TItle VII.187 Second,
the dissent asserted that "'the ADEA incorporates the remedies
and procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act ... , which differ
from those under TItle VII. "'188 Since individuals could be held
personally liable under the FLSA,189 the same result should apply
to an ADEA action. l90
Judge Fletcher concluded that the House decision was "a thor
ough and well-reasoned opinion,"191 and therefore, its holding
should be applied in cases where supervisors take part in the
wrongful termination decision. l92
III.

ANALYSIS

In refusing to hold individual defendants personally liable
under either TItle VII or the ADEA, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit narrowly interpreted acts that Congress intended to
185. Id.
186. 713 F. Supp. 159, 160 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
187. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589. "The difference in the scope of relief, in the House
court's view, foreclosed reliance on Padway in dete~ing individual liability under the
ADEA." Id. The dissent also pointed out that the "construction of the limitations
categories" of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 suggests that the damages available under
the ADEA are still more expansive. Id. at 589 n.l.
188. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589 (quoting House, 713 F. Supp. at 160). In support of
her proposition, Judge Fletcher cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 582 (1978), which stated: "This selectivity that Congress
exhibited in incorporating provisions and in modifying certain FLSA practices strongly
suggests that but for those changes Congress expressly made, it intended to incorporate
fully [into the ADEA] the remedies and procedures of the FLSA." Id.
189. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
190. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589. Judge Fletcher stated:
There is no question that an individual can be personally liable as an employer
under the FLSA; adverse employment actions attributable to individuals as a
consequence of their authority over employment decisions can lead to individ
ual liability where those actions violate the FLSA. The same result should
apply to actions brought under the ADEA.
Id. (citations omitted).
191. Id. Judge Fletcher stated that Judge Posner of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit cited House with approval in Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th
Cir. 1990). Miller, 991 F.2d at 589 n.2.
192. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589-90.
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be applied liberally.193 The statutory language and the legislative
intent of Title VII and the ADEA suggest that individual employ
ees could be held personally liable under both ActS. 194 There are
also strong arguments to suggest that individuals could be held per
sonally liable under the ADEA independent of Title VII.
A.

The Plain Meaning .of the Statutory Language Suggests' that
"Agents" Are "Emplqyers"

"Employer" is defiIied in both Title VII and the ADEA195 to
include agents of the employer.196 Although "agent" is not defined
py either Act, courts h~lVe found "agents" to be people with deci
sion-making power197 and significant control over the plaintiff's em
ployment status. 198 Thus, supervisors who engage in discriminatory
acts are "agents," and therefore "employers," under Title VII and
the ADEA.1 99
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Miller recog
nized that agents were included in the definition of Title VII and
the ADEA. Nevertheless, the court refused to find agents to be
"employers" for purposes of liability.2OO Instead, the court stated
that the "obvious purpose of this [agent] provision was to incorpo
193. For cases supporting the liberal application of TItle VII, see supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
194. For TItle VII background, see supra notes 24-46 and accompanying text. For
ADEA background, see supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
195. For the purposes of parts A and B of this subsection, this Note will treat the
definitions of employer under the ADEA and TItle VII as the same.
196. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the defini
tion of "employer" under TItle VII, and note 82 for the definition of "employer" under
the ADEA. See also Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under
Agency Principles: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND.
L. REV. 1229, 1258 (1991).
.
197. See supra .note 90 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
199. See Livingston, supra note 76, at 68-69. Including "agent" within the "em
ployer" definition "provides a logical basis for concluding that Congress intended that
owners, supervisors and other managerial personnel be subject to TItle VII .iability,
including liability for compensatory and punitive damages, where they participat~d in
.
.
discriminatory decisionmaking." Id.
200. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied
sub nom. Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994). The court relied on Padway v.
Palches, 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982), as precedent that individuals could not be held
liable for backpay: Miller, 991 F.2d at 587. However, the court in Padway did not give
any authority for this determination, and its status' as precedent is questionable since
neither party in Padway briefed the issue of individual liability of agents. See Hirsch,
supra note 167.
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rate respondeat superior liability into" TItle VII.201 However, the
court failed to offer any authority for this proposition.202
The plain language of the statute203 lends no support to the
Ninth Circuit's ipterpretation. It is a recognized canon of statutory
construction that when a word is d~fined in a statute, the definition
applies throughout the a~t, regardless of how the word may be de
fined in common usage. 204 The dalpages provisions of TItle VII and
the ADEA permit remedies against "employers."205 Thus, because
the definition of "employer" includes agents, the damages provi
sions of TItle VIJ and of the, ADEA extend to hold agents liable.
Because the provision protecting against sex discrimination
was a late addition to TItle VII,206 courts have not frequently relied
on' legislative history in sex discrimination cases. 207 Generally,
courts have relied on the literal meaning208 and post-enactment his
tory of TItle VII for guidance. 209 With the increased focus on legis
lative history in recent years, the plain meaning rule has been
201. Miller, 991 F.2d at 5ff7 (alteratipns in original) (quoting Miller v, Maxwell's
Int'l, 52 Fair EmpL Prac, Cas, (BNA) 1486, 1487 (N.D. Cal. 1990».
202. Cf. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd sub nom. Mer
itorSav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) ("The legislative history of Title VII is
virtually barren of indications, one way or another, of a vicarious responsibility for em
ployers."); see also Phillips, supra note 196, at 1258 (stating that 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b)
"is' an individual liability provision, not a vicarious liability' provision under which
agents' discriminatory actions are imputed to their employers").
203. The "plain meaning rule" states that "where the language of an enactment is
clear and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable
consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the mean
ing intended." Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule"
and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 1299,
1299 (1975) (quoting United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929».
204. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 n.lO (1979); In re Perroton, 958
F.2d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 1992); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER; SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47.07, at 151-52 (5th ed. 1992). See, e.g., Reed Dickerson, Statutory
Interpretation: Dipping Into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125 (1983).
Even applying a common dictionary's definition, "employer" is defined to include
agents with hiring authority: WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY,
supra note 73, at 743.
205. See supra notes 42-46 & 77-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
damage provisions of Title VII. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text for the
damage provisions of the ADEA.
206. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
207. See Barbara L. Graham, Supreme Court Policymaking in Civil Rights Cases:
A Study of Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, in 3A SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 659 (5th ed. 1992).
208. See supra note 203 for the classic articulation of the plain meaning rule.
209. Graham, supra note 207, at 667.
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subject to criticism.210 Nevertheless, the plain meaning rule must
be relied on in the absence of any applicable legislative history.211
The court in Johnson v. Northern Indiana Public Service CO.212
provided an interesting method by which Congress could choose to
alter this provision in the future to permit individual liability:
change "and any agent" to "or any agent."213 Nevertheless, the
court erred in refusing to find liability under the present reading of
the statute. Under the present reading, "and any agent" simply
means that an agent can be an "employer" in addition to the institu
tional employer. Under the Johnson court's reasoning, amending
the statute to "or any agent" would allow plaintiffs to circumvent
the minimum employee requirement that designates employers by
seeking recovery from an agent. This agent could be the owner of a
small company or a person likely to be indemnified by the company
in a lawsuit. 214
B.

The Legislative History Is Inconclusive as to Congress' Intent
Regarding Personal Liability215

Congress did not address the issue of individual liability during
its debates over Title VII216 or the ADEA.217 Nevertheless, an ex
amination of the legislative history suggests that Congress would
favor individual liability for those directly responsible for acts of
discrimination.
Title VII's history demonstrates a steady broadening of the
scope of damages available to victims of discrimination. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972218 expanded liability to in
210. See generally Murphy, supra note 203 (discussing the merits of abandoning
the plain meaning rule).
211. Id. at 1303. "The plain words and meaning of a statute cannot be overcome
by a legislative history which, through strained processes of deduction from events of
wholly ambiguous significance, may furnish dubious bases for inference in every direc
tion." Id. (quoting Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244,260 (1945».
212. 844 F. Supp. 466, 468 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
213. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
214. Johnson, 844 F. Stipp. at 469.
215. If the language of a statute is unambiguous, that language is conclusive,
absent clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary. Reves v. Ernst & Young,
113A S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (1993); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 873 (1991).
216. See supra notes 24-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the back
ground of Title VII.
217. See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the back
ground of the ADEA.
218. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108 &
5314 and various sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e).
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clude public employers as well as small employers.219 The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 220 further expanded the scope of liability by per
mitting compensatory and punitive damages. 221 Furthermore,
courts should liberally interpret Title VII to provide compensation
for victims of discrimination. 222
The court of appeals in Miller determined that Congress in
tended to exclude "small entities" by limiting liability to only those
employers with fifteen or more employees.223 According to the
court, Congress could not have intended for individuals to be found
personally liable under Title VII.224 An examination of the legisla
tive history, however, shows the flaw in the court's reasoning. 225
Congress expanded the definition of "employer" in 1972 to ap
ply to small businesses responsible for discriminatory conduct. 226
By rejecting the portion of the House bill227 establishing the em
ployee limit at eight, Congress compromised in order to satisfy
those concerned with the effect on small business. 228 The concern
was that many small businesses were family run and that the owners
were unfamiliar with the intricacies of federal law.229 Conse
quently, it would be improper to hold such businesses liable under
Title VII.230
219. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
- 220. Pub. L. No. 102-166,105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in various sections
of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e).
221. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 8 and cases cited therein.
223. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub
nom. Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994); contra Bishop v. Okidata, Inc., 864 F.
Supp. 416 (D.NJ. 1994) (finding small employers exempted from Title VII and the
Americans with Disabilities Act because of undue burden on financial condition, but
noting that individuals have always been liable for torts Committed in the workplace,
and, thus, should be subject to personal liability).
224. Miller,991 F.2d at 587.
225. This reasoning is flawed when you consider that "employer" is defined to
include "any person," and person is defined to include "one or more individuals." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1988). Under this interpretation, an
individual that is engaged in an industry affecting commerce and supervises fifteen or
more employees could be considered an employer. This individual could simultane
ously be an agent of a larger entity, yet the individual could still be personally liable for
his own discriminatory acts or those of his supervisory employees.
226. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
227. See H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).
228. See supra note 69.
229. See Lamberson, supra note 5, at 427. Congress, in debating the limitation on
the number of employees, focused on "the effect on the personal nature of small busi
nesses and not to the financial hardship that might occur." Id. (citing 110 CoNG. REc.
12,645-47 (1964».
230. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).
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It is highly unlikely that Congress was so subtle as to suggest

that individuals should not be liable because they are "small enti
ties." If this was Congress' intention, it could have placed the same
number restriction on agents as it did on employers.231 Further
more, the availability of tort-like remedies232 is additional evidence
that Congress would approve finding discriminators liable. 233
After presenting the basis for its opinion, the court in Miller
atteinpted to reconcile its decision with other cases which found su
pervisors to be agents, liable only in their "official" capacities.234
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Congress intended to limit
agent liability in this way. Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights
Act of 1991,235 permitted the awarding of compensatory and puni
tive damages, damages which are regularly held against individuals
(as opposed to reinstatement and backpay).236 In addition, the "of
ficiaUindividual" distinction is flawed in light of the personal nature
of discrimination. In situations where the employer has sufficiently
distanced itself from the discriminatory act, finding supervisors lia
ble only in their "official" capacities leaves victims of discrimination
without a remedy.
Clearly, courts have raised important issues involving the im
. position of compensatory and punitive damages under the frame
231. See supra note 225.
232. The Court in United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992), determined that
Title VII remedies existing prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (i.e.,
backpay, reinstatement and injunctive relief) were wage-like, not tort-like, for tax pur
poses. However, the Court did not address whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
permitted additional remedies of compensatory and punitive damages, would have an
effect on this determination. Id. at 1872 n.8; contra 112 S. Ct. at 1878 (O'Conner, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs do not fix the character of
. the right they seek to enforce. The purposes and operation of Title VII are closely
analogous to those of tort law, and that similarity should determine excludability of
recoveries for personal injury [under the tax code].").
233. The court in Miller also pointed to the limitations for compensatory damages
based on employer size as evidence that Congress did not intend to impose individual
liability. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied
sub nom. Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Q. 1049 (1994). However, these damage provisions
are likely to face court challenges. CONTE, supra note 4, at § 2.21 (Supp. 1993). Bills
have also been submitted in the House and the Senate that would either eliminate com
pletely or severely restrict these damage caps. See supra note 80.
234. 991 F.2d at 587; see supra note 169.
235. Congress did not amend the definition of "employer" in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, so arguably the congressional intent as to the interpretation of this statute is
limited to its initial enactment and its subsequent amendment in 1972. The increase in
available damages is only evidence as to what Congress' present intent may be on this
issue.
236. See, e.g., Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); contra Vodde v. Indiana Mich. Power Co., 852 F. Supp. 676, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
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work estabiished by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.237 Congress
needs to create a liability scheme for individuals that would be pro
portionate to the size of the supervisor's employer. The present
scheme of liability for these damages is not indicative of congres
siomil intent to preclud.e personal liability, but rather demonstrates
that Congress did not contemplate the issue of individual liability at
all. Congress has not "clearly expressed [a] legislative intent" con
trary to the express reading of the statute. Therefore, the unambig
uous language of the statute must control. 238
The Supreme Court of the United States stated in Meritor Sav
ings Bank, FSB v. Vinson239 that courts should apply common law
agency principles in determining whether employers can be held li
able for the discriminatory actions of their supervisors. 240 At least
one commentator has stated that the Meritor Court implied that
supervisors could actually be held individually liable under TItle
VII.241 However, supervisors cannot be considered agents242 when
acting outside the scope of employment. 243 Thus, TItle VII would
not cover extreme forms of discrimination by employees for which
courts would not find employers directly liable. 244
Courts have had considerable difficulty in applying agency
237. See Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Auth., 852 F. Supp. 1512 (M.D.
Ala. 1994); see also supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Saville decision.
238. See supra note 215 and cases cited therein.
239. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
240. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of ·the Mer
itor decision.
241. See 1 SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at § 8.7.4 ("[A]s the [Meritor] majority opin
ion suggests, the harassers are themselves liable because they remain agents of the em
ployer and therefore are 'employers' within the meaning of Title VII."). Courts have
also applied agency principles against supervisors individually. See Lamirande v. Reso
lution Trust Corp., 834 F. Supp. 526, 529 & n.3 (D.N.H. 1993); Griffith v. Keystone Steel
& Wire, 858 F. Supp. 802 (C.D. Ill. 1994).
242. See supra note 137.
243. See Maria M. Carrillo, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervi
sor Under Title VII: Reassessment of Employer Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 41, 67 (1992-93).
Factors used in determining scope of employment include determining where the
discriminatory act occurred, when the act occurred, and whether the act was foresee
able by the employer. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 217-32
(1958). Even if an act is explicitly forbidden by the employer, it may still be within the
scope of employment. Id. at § 230. Section 235 provides: "An act of a servant is not
within the scope of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as a part of
or incident to a service on account of which he is employed." Id. at § 235.
244. Arguably, this results in a "liability gap." See Kandel, supra note 6. How
ever, courts are beginning to develop a common law tort of discrimination that may
provide a remedy against supervisors individually. See Terry M. Dworkin et aI., Theo

176

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:143

principles in ntle VII and ADEA cases.245 . In fact, the Meritor
Court itself stated that "such common-law principles may not be
transferable' in all their particulars to Title VII."246 Thus, the
Court's statement that Congress' intent in establishing the "agent"
provision was .for courts. to apply ag~ncy principles to determine
when employers should be liable has not been well accepted in the
legal community.247
C.

Individual Liability Under the ADEA

Congress passed the ADEA in order to provide even stronger
penalties for age discrimination than were available under Title VII.
Congress did this because age discrimination was often more subtle
and more widespread than sex or race discrimination. The ADEA
from its enactment provided greater remedies, although small busi
nesses were granted more immunity under the statutory
provisions. 248
Some courts have distinguished the ADEA from ntle VII with
regard to individual liability based on'the ADEA's relation to the
FLSA, which has widely been accepted to provide remedies against
individual defendants. 249 Althoughthe ADEA's definition of "em
ployer" more closely resembles the Title VII definition than it does
the FLSA's,250 the interpretation of the ADEA definition of "em
ries of Recovery for Sexual Harassment: Going Beyond Title VII,25 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
125 (1988).
Notably, there has been a sharp increase over the past ten years of common law
tort action against employers. See Ronald M. Green, The Manager's Personal Liability
in Issues of Employment Law, II ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: EMPLOY.
MENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
927, 930 (1988). Common law causes of action frequently brought include assault and
battery, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and
false imprisonment. Id.; see also Brown & Abell, supra note 13, at pt. V(A}.
245. See generally Phillips, supra note 196, at 1255 (stating that agency rules are
poorly adapted to supervisor sexual harassment cases because the primary aim of these
rules is to determine the principal's liability to third parties, not to their own employ
ees); Lutner, supra note 134, at 598 & 599 ("The guidance offered by Meritor has
proven inadequate ... [and] lower courts have applied agency principles to hostile
environment sexual harassment cases with varied results.").
246. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,72 (1986).
247. See Lutner, supra note 134, at 602·08.
248. The definition of "employer" under the ADEA requires a minimum of 20
employees, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b} (1988), compared to TItle VII's minimum of 15 employ
ees. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b} (1988).
249. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
250. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 630(b} (1988) (quoted in full supra note 82) with 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) (quoted in full supra note 66) and 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1988)
(quoted supra note 84).
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ployer" is distinguishable from Title VII.
In the Miller dissent, Judge Fletcher argued that liability under
the ADEA should be distinguished from liability under Title VII.251
Adopting the holding in House v. Cannon Mills Co. ,252 Judge
Fletcher argued that the ADEA expressly and impliedly incorpo
rated the FLSA remedy provisions and the case law that accompa
nies them.253 Thus, "the clear import of the statutory language" of
the ADEA suggests that employee supervisors should be person
ally liable.254
A review of the statutory language of the ADEA, the legisla
tive history of the Act, and the subsequent case law strongly sug
gests that if individual liability is found under Title VII, such
liability should also be found under the ADEA (assuming the em
ployer has more than twenty employees). Even without Title VII
liability, it seems clear that individuals can be held liable under the
ADEA. By incorporating the remedies of the FLSA, the ADEA
also acquired the interpretations of the remedy provisions accorded
under the FLSA, including the establishment of individual
liability.255
Nevertheless, because of the similarities between the definition
of "employer" under the ADEA and Title VII, many courts con
tinue to hold that the two statutes should be given the same inter
pretation with regard to this issue. The FLSA definition,
establishing an employer as "any person acting directly or indirectly
in the interest of an employer,"256 is broader, but nonetheless com
parable, to the ADEA's agent provision. Looking to common in
terpretations of "agent," one dictionary defined an agent as "one
that acts for or in the place of another by authority from him."257
The court in House affirmed that although the ADEA did not "ex
pressly incorporate" the FLSA definition, the two definitions are
251. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir. 1993) (Fletcher, I.,
dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).
252. 713 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
253. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589. The Miller court rejected the House opinion on the
basis that it was decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
created damages similar to those available under the ADEA. Id. The majority also
rejected the adoption of case law interpreting the "employer" definition since the
ADEA does not explicitly incorporate the FLSA definition. Id. at 588 n.3.
254. Id. at 589 (citing House, 713 F. Supp. at 161-62).
255. Of course, the FLSA provides no guidance in determining individual liability
under TItle VII.
256. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1988).
257. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 73, at 40.
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comparable. 258
CONCLUSION

In light of the history and interpretations of Title VII and the
ADEA, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred in con
cluding that individual supervisors could not be held personally lia
ble for acts of discrimination. 259 The plain meaning of the
definition of "employer" under both Title VII and the ADEA sug
gests that "agents" are to be considered employers for the purposes
of the acts.260 The damages provisions of both acts provide reme
dies against "employers."261 Since the legislative intent is ambigu
ous as to whether individuals can be held liable, the clear statutory
language controls. Finally, courts have found individual liability
under the ADEA based on its relationship with the FLSA.
Cases such as Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc. demon
strate the importance in finding individual liability under circum
stances where the victim of discrimination cannot otherwise be
made whole. Finding supervisors liable will create a "front line de
fense" against discrimination. 262 Although Congress needs to
establish a proper measure of compensatory and punitive damages
to be assessed against supervisors,263 victims of discrimination are
258. House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 160 n.1 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
259. Miller v. Maxwell's In1'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub
nom. Miller V. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988).
261. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1993); 42 U.S.c. § 1981a (Supp. V
1993); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988); see supra notes 42-46,60-61,77-81, and accompanying
text.
262. Williams, supra note 13, at 218. "Supervisors and managers provide the
front line defense against employment discrimination for the institutional employer.
Personal liability provides a greater incentive for the individual supervisor to guarantee
a discrimination-free workplace." Id.
263. See Theodore F. Claypoole, Inadequacies in Civil Rights Law: The Need for
Sexual Harassment Legislation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1151, 1169 (1987).
Congress should create a federal cause of action against the harassing em
ployee . . .. Assignment of persorialliability to any supervisory employee who
sexually harasses a nonsupervisory employee, and holding the harassing em
ployee responsible for equitable, compensatory, and punitive relief would
prove most effective. Allowing such penalties strikes at the heart of sexual
harassment by forcing employees to be personally accountable for their own
actions in the workplace. The severity of the penalties serves as a punishment
for socially unacceptable behavior and a warning to other employees.
Id.
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still entitled to adequate compensation from those capable of
paying.
Steven K. Sanborn

